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Religion has always played a role in nation formation, and continues 
to do· so even in these late-modern and post-sacred times. The overall 
argument of the essay is that the nation formation involves both deep 
continuities and radical discontinuities with sacredly conceived ways 
of life. It is not wrong to say that religious evocation is bound up in 
the will to power, but it is important to recognize that there are much 
larger social reasons why religion is linked to the name of the nation. 
This essay thus resonates with Ivan.Strenski's article in this volume 
when he argues that processes of legitimation go deep into the past. 
However, it adds another claim: namely, that religious evocation 
works as an act of legitimation because of the very nature of the 
community (the nation) in whose name the evocation is made. Read 
though the flickering screen of the globalising and postmodernising 
nation state with all its contradictions, it is hard to see any 
continuities-of-form here. The continuities at most appear as surface 
content, and even then only as points of reference, a Jewish Bible, a 
Christian cross, a slab of engraved marble. However, the 
postmodernllate-modern nation has all the ontological vulnerabilities 
of the prior dominant forms of polity. Despite unprecedented technical 
power, it still has to legitimize itself, at one level, through basic 
categories of human existence such as embodiment, placement and 
temporal transcendence. 
Religion has always played a role in nation formation, and continues to do so 
even in these late-modem·and post-sacred times. 1 One week after the attack, on the 
Saturday night, the world watched as the actors and singers from Hollywood and 
MTV mourned the tragic loss of life that occurred in attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon. The program, a telethon fundraiser entitled America: A 
Tribute to Heroes, was broadcast to 210 countries. Celine Dion sang 'God Bless 
America' and the evening ended with the now iconic video-image of the US flag 
flying silently over the debris of the collapsed towers. Clint Eastwood, affecting 
the same expression that he wore in his film In the Line of Fire (1993), spoke in 
suitably apocalyptic terms about 'ultimate triumph': 
The terrorists who wanted three-hundred million victims, instead are going 
to get three-hundred million heroes, three-hundred million Americans with 
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broken hearts, unbreakable hopes for our country and our future. In the 
, c(>nflict that's come upon us, we're determined as our parents and our 
grandparents were before us to win through the ultimate triumph - so help 
usGod. · 
This· is the response of an insecure. nation undergoing change. In this context, 
only cliched.reversions to the Manichean Cold War rhetoric of the kind 'if you're 
not for us, you;re against us' seem adequate to the momentousness of the new. 
George W. Bush's State of the Union address on 30 January 2003 is another case 
in point~ Oii the eve of invading Iraq he said: 'We exercise power without 
conquest; and we sacrifice for the liberty of strangers. Americans are free people, 
who lmowthat freedom is the right of every person and the future of every nation. 
The liberty we prize is not America's gift to the world, it is God's gift to 
humanitY':, Apart from the obvious hubris hidden beneath the modest disclaimer 
that America didnot create the liturgy of liberty, the speech like his 'Axis of Evil' 
notion evokes a sacred claim about what is at stake in the War on Terror. His 
speech elldedwith words that were atonce cliched and disturbingly powerful: 
" . 
w'e dci not kno~..::_we do not cl~ to know all the ways of providence, yet we 
can trust in them, plaCing our confidence in the loving God behind all of life 
·and all of; history. May he guide us now. And may God continue to bless the 
United States of America. · 
Bush's evoqations exemplify the overall argument of the essay that the nation 
formation involves both deep continuities and radical discontinuities with sacredly 
conceived ways of life. Put very crudely this double process could be understood 
in terms of an insecure secular and modem world looking back to a traditional 
time when life was simpler and the enemy was simply evil. In these terms 'God 
being on our side' is now evoked as an anachronistic public-relations exercise, a 
cynical· use. of religion to legitimatize a push for extensions of global power. This 
line ofanalysis, however, does notquite work-and it not just because George W. 
Bush, Tony Blair and John Howardmay actually believe in God. It is not wrong to 
say that religious evocation is bound up in the will to power, but it is important to 
recognize that th,ere are much larger social reasons why religion is linked to the 
name ofthe nation; This essay thus resonates with Ivan Strenski's article in this 
volume when he argues that processes of legitimation go deep into the past. 
However, it adds another claim: namely, that religious evocation works as an act 
of legitimation because ofthe very riature of the community (the nation) in whose 
name the evocation is made. 
Setting up a more satisfactory generalizing argument involves some 
substantial' claims: first, the nation is an abstract community of strangers-secular 
and horizontal_:__that continues to ground its subjectivities in the very categories 
which in the modem world have been substantially reconstituted. Such grounding 
categories include relations of embodied connection (for example, the death of 
soldiers ,of the nation in war), times of sacred recollection (for example, 
commemorations ofbattles and momentS of 'heroism'), and places of enduring 
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nature (for example, state cemeteries and cenotaphs). The use of the concept of 
grounding here is intentional. It marks a clear distinction from the prominent 
modernist theorists of nationalism such as Ernest Gellner (1983), Anthony 
Giddens (1985), and even Benedict Anderson (1991), who treat these categorical 
elements as the mere traditional· content, refabricated for a modern context. By 
contrast, I am suggesting that these things still have categorical meaning as part of 
the continuing contradictory form of the nation-state as abstract political 
community. This lived continuity has become clearer as the modern connection 
between nation and state has become problematized. In the contemporary world, I 
argue, embedded ontological categories have continuing significance for the 
nation, even as such evocations become less and less relevant to the state. The 
discontinuity can be understood as a process of abstraction and reconstitution of 
prior ways of living in, and understanding, community and polity. 
The nation-state and religious evocation 
It is not however that religion itself, or even practices or texts projected in its 
name, are foundational for the formation of the nation and later nation-state. It is 
rather that calling upon God and calling upon the nation are not antithetical acts as 
the modernist theorists of nationalism tend to proclaim. They partake of the same 
process of abstracting from the onto logically grounded. By taking the (historically 
changing) place of religion seriously we can qualify the over-exuberant 
modernism of those who argue that the nation comes into being with the epochal 
translation of the sacred into the secular, that is, with the obliteration of the world 
of sacred nature-culture. In making this claim the motif of the communicable 
Word-covenant, constitution or Bible-can be as a signifier of a broader 
argument that for traditional communities to become nations it is necessary that at 
one level they be abstracted from the cultural immediacies of place and face-to-
face relations. A second motif of the stone-in particular stones commemorating 
sacred ascension, transcendent mortality or moments of national glory-to signify 
the intimately related argument that nation formation rests on a deep contradiction 
between the radical abstraction of social relations and a recalling of (culturally 
framed) 'eternal' nature. 
While Christianity finds a synthetic way of handling this ontological 
contradiction between transcendence and embeddedness in the notion of the Word-
Become-Flesh, the nation, I suggest, takes a different if apparently parallel path. 
The modern nation becomes an abstract community of strangers, but one that 
draws on the subjectivities and ideologies of abstract attachment to embodied 
others (blood-become-sacrifice) and actual places (soil-become-territory). Unlike 
Christianity where Jesus is simultaneously God, God-Incarnate, and an embodied 
mortal man, no one actual person can stand in for the nation. National community, 
or more particularly each 'ordinary person' within it, potentially carries that 
embodied connection. Certainly the nation throws up abstracted icons. Female 
figures lifted out of history were the most serious contenders for this role. 
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Boadicea, Joan of Arc or Marianne became iconic figures with their historical and 
particularized bodies left behind. However, it is indicative of the contradictory 
nature of the abstraction of the nation that its only lasting iconic representative is 
the 'person' whose name we will 'never' know-the Unknown Soldier. This 
abstracted soul, who like Jesus dies for us all, preferably has no remains, no bones 
to identify him. However, unlike Jesus with his body gone and the stone rolled 
away, the soul of the Unknown Soldier dwells beneath massive slabs of stones, 
firmly located in place. Even the postmodern versions of these cenotaphs depend 
on the symbolic stability of eternal nature. 
Australia, one of the 'Coalition of the Willing', provides a telling example 
that points up the contradictions of the nation-state. In July 2000, to mark the 
hundredth anniversary of the passing of the Australian Constitutional Bill-the 
signing of Australian semi-independence as an imperial colony-five Australian 
prime ministers, past and present, attended a service at Westminster Cathedral, 
London. As part of the celebrations Tony Blair agreed to build an Australian war 
shrine in the heart of London in recognition of the sacrifice of Australian soldiers 
who died defending Britain. Addressing parliament the next day and recounting 
the agreement, Prime Minister Blair by a slip of naming lauded not Australian but 
'American servicemen and women'. It was a fitting finale to the ambiguously 
successful Australian attempt over the previous decade to make itself unique by 
revitalising its memory of those who had fallen in war. A central part of this 
process included belatedly following other countries of the world to find 
Australia's own Unknown Soldier. In the eulogy; Paul Keating spoke of a nation 
without modern nationalism:2 
This unknown soldier is not interred here to glorify war over peace; or to 
assert a soldier's character over a civilian's; or one race or one nation or one 
religion above another; or men above women; of the war in which he fought 
and died above any other war; or of any one generation above any that has or 
will come later. 
Similarly, the sculptors of the tomb spoke self-consciously of the 
monument's abstract design as inviting dialogue across times and places. Standing 
behind the head of the red-marble slab they placed four ten-metre pillars 
representing the primordial elements of fire, water, earth and air-the stuff of life 
and death. Here traditionalism met postmodernism. How do we know that the 
bones lying beneath the red marble, the person exhumed from a cemetery near the 
French village of Villers-Bretonneux, is an Australian rather than a German 
soldier? For some this is the question that cannot be asked, and for others is an 
irrelevancy. Either way, the Word and the stone are still there helping to explain to 
us the power and immortality of the nation. 
In filling out this argument the essay turns to the United States, a nation that 
sees itself as an exemplary Nation. The narrative begins as the United States 
breaks away from Britain to establish a republic and then a nation-state. Here my 
argument will be that by the nineteenth century, the dominant. culture of 
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postcolonial America was using the Bible as a point of legitimation rather than as a 
sign of a covenant between nation and God.3 This is not to suggest that the 
evocations became less intense. Quite the opposite. By the beginning of the 
twenty-first century the American Olympic basketball team could call a press 
conference to declare both their attachment to each other and their faith in the 
Bible. However, despite these nationalist evocations of the Book of God, it goes 
almost without saying that the new gods of Mammon, Global Capitalism and 
Liberal Freedom provided the dominant structural level of that rapidly changing 
national state as much as the others of the world. 
All of this has the effect of qualifying Benedict Anderson's way of setting up 
his theory of the nation. While what I have been describing is a layered dialectic of 
continuity-and-discontinuity, a layering of ontological formations, he puts the 
pivotal emphasis on an epochal shift from traditionalism to modernism. Moreover, 
he focuses on a historically much later shift in the mode of 
communication-print-as it intersects with a new mode of 
production-capitalism. A fuller response to Anderson's path-breaking work 
would require working through the significance of other changing modes of 
practice beyond production and communication, including layers of 
transformations in the modes of exchange, organization and enquiry. However, for 
present purposes, all that I want to do is qualify the epochal tone of his argument 
that the national consciousness becomes possible only when 'three fundamental 
cultural conceptions, all of great antiquity, lost their axiomatic grip on men's 
minds' (Anderson, 1981: 36): first, the conception that a particular script-language 
such as Church Latin offered privileged access to the ontological truth; secondly, 
that monarchs ruled naturally as the divine legatees; and thirdly, that religious 
cosmology and history were indistinguishable. In beginning to qualifying this 
proposition, it is worth remembering that it was Church Latin that gave us the 
connected concepts of natus and natio. The Bible, for example, is replete with the 
naming of peoples, communities who at one level continued to live as twelve 
tribes long after they were named, at a more abstract level, as an interconnected 
whole. 
Evocating a nation: 'In God we trust' 
Throughout the essay I have been careful to treat the nation and state as 
different phenomena, analytically separable even during the time of the classic 
modern nation-state when in the late-nineteenth century the nation as community 
and the state as polity came into a taken-for-granted hyphenated union. This 
section takes up this theme in relation to the United States of America as it broke 
away from British colonial rule. We move now to the Puritans of New England as 
they set out to establish a polity of the New Testament. In the period prior to the 
formal constituting of the United States in the eighteenth century, the Puritan 
'settlement' of the Americas was defended, in Perry Miller's phrase, as the act of a 
'Bible Commonwealth'. They saw themselves as forging a covenant with God. 
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Miller is worth quoting at length to compare with what comes later: 
Long before they came to America, [the New England theologians] had 
become members of a school of doctrine now know as the 'federal' or 
'covenant' theology. They revised or amplified pure Calvinism by defining 
the relationship between the predestined elect and his God not merely as the 
passive recipient of grace, as did Calvin, but as an active. covenant, after the 
model of that between Abraham and Jehovah in the Book of Genesis. 
According to this doctrine, the saint was redeemed not simply by an infusion 
of grace, but by being taken into a league with God, an explicit compact 
drawn up between two partners, wherein the saint promised to obey God's 
will and God promised infallibly to grant him salvation. Starting with this 
notion of a personal and inward covenant, the theologians extended it to the 
church and state. They argued that a nation of saints, all of whom were 
personally in covenant with God, would also be in covenant with Him as body 
politic (Miller, 1967: 17). 
Thus the New Englanders as a community had by a double act of free 
volition-migrating to North America and submitting to the laws of the 
Bible-made themselves into a chosen people in a promised land. In their 
religious-political tracts they, or at least their scribes, expressed the belief that had 
forged a covenant that could be enacted in a state. However, by the time of the 
American Revolution, the notion of a covenant with God was being overlaid by a 
self-framed contract, sustained through the laws of nature. The 'citizenry', or 
rather their ruling and writing classes, had discovered natural rights-God-given in 
basis, but 'self-evident' laws of nature nevertheless. These were laws that just 
required writing down by God-fearing rational scholars (and gentlemen) in order 
to become laws of state. Thus contrary to the claims of the modernist theories of 
the nation, here we find two cosmologies, the Biblical and the modern rational 
coming together, albeit in contradictory and overlaying ways. 'Americans had 
succeeded', Perry Miller says with muted irony, 'where the Jews did not, in 
recovering something of the pristine virtue ... Yet once the machinery of national 
humiliation proved effective in producing the providential victory of the 
Americans, were they not bound to the prophecy that by their utilization of the 
form, they and they alone, would bring about a reign of national bliss?' (Miller, 
1967: 103, 105). In other words, the 'citizenry' now written into existence by the 
Declaration of Independence were now, at the level of their communion in the 
abstracted state, set free from God to make their own way in the world. The 
constitution (in both senses of the word) of the abstract state became the highest 
expression of that freedom and the republic of 'these United States' (plural not 
singular) was about to be born. At this point, Liah Greenfeld gets carried away into 
a swooning summation ofthe civic purity of this beginning: 'in a certain, analytic, 
sense', she says only partly covering her partisan tracks, 'the American nation is 
an ideal nation: the national element in it is challenged by the fewest 
counterinfluences; it is a more pure example of national community than any 
other' (Greenfeld, 1993: 403). The evidence, including her own detailed narrative, 
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suggests otherwise. The United States is born not as nation or nation-state but as a 
republic in a complex intersection of continuities with the past and discontinuous 
new beginnings. The projected covenant with God waits until the middle of the 
nineteenth century to become the cultural evocation of an emerging nation and, 
during the same period, the contract with men (no women were there for the 
writing of the constitution) becomes the political codification of the federating 
unitary state. The state in effect rejects any such covenant while the nation makes 
it a contested expression of piety (Foster, 1996). 
It is indicative of this tension that in the highest written document of state, 
the Constitution, the Bible is absent, as is the concept of 'the nation'. Even in the 
Declaration of Independence-written by a secret congress of strangers meeting in 
the home of a lecturer in scientific obstetrics-God is reduced to 'nature's god' 
(lower case). Nature's god is embedded within the first couple of paragraphs of the 
Declaration as it begins by naturalizing the break with the British Crown: 'in the 
course of human events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the 
political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the 
powers of the earth the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and 
of nature's god entitle them ... ' (quoted in Wills, 1979: 374).This accords with 
Thomas Jefferson's contradictory modernism. He calls upon the Bible but writes, 
for example, with extraordinary relativism of the 'family God of Abraham, .of 
Isaac and of Jacob, and the local God oflsrael' (quoted in Grosby, 1993: 62). Here 
we are at the end of the eighteenth century and while the post-colonial republic has 
been formally signed into existence as the United States, there is a long way to go 
in establishing a nation-state. 
While there is no demarcation point, no calendrical marker at which time we 
can say that the United States became a nation-state, it is possible to give some 
symbolic high points in the connecting of the secular-state/sacred-nation. In these 
the Bible is present, even if as rhetorical evocation rather than as indicative of the 
hopes for a Bible Commonwealth. Gary Wills, despite the postmodern title of his 
book Inventing America (1979) is brilliantly insightful here in his discussion of the 
Biblical overtones in Lincoln's Gettysburgh address of 1863. The speech begins: 
'Four-score-and-seven years ago, our Fathers brought forth ... ' Why such a stilted 
style? Why four-score-and-seven? To hear the phrase in the context of Victorian 
America is to hear the biblical overtones, says Wills. There is no reason to 
immediately start counting back eighty-seven years from 1863 to get 1776. It 
allows Lincoln, in effect, to get around the issue that the date 1776 is no automatic 
marker of the beginning of the nation-state. In fact the thirteen original colonies 
had instructed their delegates to sign the Declaration of Independence on the basis 
that it did not imply a unified polity. Even more pointedly Lincoln was talking in 
the middle of a war of states that would by its end kill over half-a-million people. 
Why centre the nation on the phrase 'Our father's brought forth'? President 
Lincoln is drawing on the biblical references to Our Father and the faith of our 
fathers. As Wills puts it, 'Lincoln is talking about generation on the spot. The 
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nation is rightly called new because it is brought forth maieutically, by midwifery; 
it is not only new but newborn. The suggested image is, throughout, of a hieros 
gamos, a marriage of male heaven ("our fathers") and a female earth ("this 
continent"). And it is a miraculous conception, a virgin birth (Wills, 1979: xv) 
At the very time of Lincoln's calling upon the language of redemption to 
connect a nation-at-war-with-itself, the Bible had ceased to be substantially more 
than a legitimating signifier of the state-nation. Though, as I argued earlier, the 
bureaucratic state and the religions-of-the-word grew up together, by the 
nineteenth century this had fundamentally changed. The state and the sacred had 
ceased to be symbiotic. Individuals continued to have faith, but the state-nation as 
a polity-community of liberal individuals was assuming a more urgent calling that 
the Kingdom of God. In the middle of that century as Congress voted to put the 
phrase 'In God We Trust' on the nation's currency and to recognise officially 
Thanksgiving Day as one of the nation's holy-days, the Bible had become a book 
to wave around at public meetings, cite passages from and swear upon, but not a 
book of instruction to guide the practices of the increasingly abstract state. In 
short, while the Word continued to be relevant to the nation, it became less and 
less important to the state. This development would reduce the Bible to a thing of 
national evocation as the nation and state were drawn together at the end of the 
nineteenth century. 
Themes in the constitution of the nation 
Now at a time when the rules of war are being rewritten, it is important to 
recognize that the mainstream American sense of its own exceptionalism has 
continuities that go back into through Lincoln to formation of the nation of 
America. There are lots of counter-examples to these themes, but it can 
nevertheless be argued that they continue to be dominant in mainstream thinking 
and practice. One continuing theme involves a 'mythical tribute' to the 
regeneration of peace through violence. It is the peace that always comes after the 
conflict, like the freeze-frame at the end of Deer Hunter or Three Kings (note the 
religious reference). From the Indian wars, the War of Independence to Vietnam 
and Kosovo, 'peace' is always the backgrounded but transcendental moment that 
links the community of fate across time. 
A second theme is the essential virtue of acting to defend Truth, Infinite 
Justice and the (American) Way. Defence always requires action. Despite the 
failings (or heroism) of any one particular individual or institution in the United 
States, or even of the state itself, there is always an active figure of redemption. 
President Bush knows that he might be making a mistake in the particularities of 
his actions, but (connecting the two themes) given that an outsider has cut across 
the peace of the community of fate he has no choice but to act. He will be forgiven 
for acting wrongly, but he would not have been forgiven for appearing to 
acquiesce to an outsider's attack on American soil. 
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This brings us to a third theme, the ambiguity of an abiding sense of home 
soil and the projection of a frontier that has no boundaries. Having its roots in an 
expansionist ideology called the doctrine of Manifest Destiny first proclaimed in 
1845, American national interest has long been defined in terms that treated 
extensions of its frontier as part of its civilising mission. With the first two themes 
we can, for example, rewrite them with Australian examples from Gallipoli to the 
doctrine of 'forward defence'. However, with this third theme of sacred-
soil/extended-frontier the United States has an accentuated fear of the unbounded 
movements of others that goes beyond the fears that even mainstream Australia 
has evinced recently over the Tampa refugee crisis. The old domino theory and the 
necessity of defending the world against communists in Vietnam, was reborn 
against drug runners in Panama, against Arab expansionists in Iraq, and now 
against terrorists in Afghanistan. Australia follows the United States into 
crusades.4 By contrast the United States' government feels that it simply has to be 
there. Notwithstanding the occasional recurrences of American 'isolationism', the 
norm is for US leaders to feel an over-riding pressure to act in the world. 
· Carrying though the motif of the Declaration of Independence, I want to 
finish this essay with a contemporary example of an independence-day speech that 
I am fond of quoting. It comes from a film about aliens attacking the earth. In 
Independence Day (1996), Bill Pullman, President of the United States, speaks of 
the fourth of July becoming the rallying point for all mankind. This time it is the 
White House rather than the World Trade Center that has been destroyed. The 
President stands to address the assembled: 
Good morning. In less than an hour, aircraft from here will join with others 
from around the world. And you will be launching the largest aerial battle in 
the history of mankind. 'Mankind'- that word should have new meaning for 
all of us. We can't be consumed by petty differences any more. We will be 
united in our common interest. Perhaps it's faith. Today is the fourth of July, 
and you will once more fight for our freedom. Not from tyranny, oppression 
or persecution, but from alienation. We're fighting for our right to live, to 
exist. And should we win the day, the fourth of July will no longer be known 
as an American holiday, but as the day when the whole world declared in one 
voice: 'we will not go quietly into the night, we will not vanish without a 
fight, we are going to survive'. Today we celebrate our independence day! 
(emphasis added). 
The ambiguity of those tiny little words, 'we' and 'our', are the key to 
understanding the passage. It is striking how comfortably Hollywood translates 
fighting for transnational peace back into the heritage of one nation-state: pax 
Americana. We all know that the Fourth of July is not just another American 
holiday. It signifies the formation of the modern American nation. However, by 
the time we get to the last line, 'Today we celebrate our independence day', the 
ambiguous appellation 'our' has linked modern nationalism and postmodern 
cosmopolitanism in a comfortable pastiche that challenges nothing. It draws upon 
the spirit of Pax Christi but surrounds it with postmodern irony: 'perhaps it's 
150 Australian Religion Studies Review 
faith'. However, if the Bible is absent from the political faith-statement itself, it 
still lingers on around the edges. Just before the speech, one of the pilots who is 
about to fly into space to combat the aliens gets married under the sign of the 
Christian cross and 'in the sight of God', and just after the speech the other pilot 
hands his father a copy of the Jewish Bible covered by a skull-cap. 
Ifyou read between the lines of the set speeches in this and similar films, the 
speakers still assume that the United States sits at the helm of world politics, but 
supposedly no longer as the modern homogenising nation-state against the evil 
empire. It is now projected as, on the one hand, a postnational representative of a 
set of self-evident universalistic values and, on the other, as the exemplary open-
textured nation and state. We are back, full circle, to the introduction to this essay. 
In the post-Reagan years, from Clinton to Bush or Gore, the exponents of this kind 
of 'postnationalism', move in two directions at once. They call on whatever is at 
hand to give spiritual and embodied depth to their vision of a world made peaceful 
for the market, and they underwrite the technological means of conducting human 
relations at a distance, from communicating with others to conducting undeclared 
and systematic acts of abstract violence. The wars over Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Kosovo, for example-that is, put in less euphemistic terms, the waves of bombing 
from a great height as a way of resolving problems of great complexity-are an 
outcome of this process but not simply as acts of wilful domination. With the 
partial exception of the Second Gulf War, they are also a consequence of fearing 
the electoral backlash if their own soldiers die and too many come home in body 
bags to be buried in sacred soil. This is one of the contradictions ofthe present: our 
capacity to live with the systematic destruction of nameless people in places far 
away, and a heightened sensitivity to the death of a single person if we know their 
name and can see the image of their face. 
Throughout the essay, I have being arguing about the dialectic of continuity 
and discontinuity. Read though the flickering screen of the globalising and 
postmodernising nation state with all its contradictions, it is hard to see any of 
continuities-of-form here. The continuities at most appear as surface content, and 
even then only as points of reference, a Jewish Bible, a Christian cross, a slab of 
engraved marble. However, the postmodern/late-modern nation has all the 
ontological vulnerabilities of the prior dominant forms of polity-from traditional 
kingdom and absolutist state to the classical modern nation-state. Despite 
unprecedented technical power, it still has to legitimize itself, at one level, through 
basic categories of human existence such as embodiment, placement and the 
temporal transcendence. It is one way of handling the existential question of the 
transcendence of the community-polity despite the assured mortality of all who 
live within it. Those who speak for the nation will continue to do so--for good and 
evil. On the positive side, evoking the sacred will continue for so long as we give 
symbolic depth to our cultural differences from others and seek meaning and 
identity beyond the various banal, prosaic and individualistic claims that can be 
made about our place in time. On the negative side, these invocations will continue 
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to be used to rationalize violence insofar as we fail to interrogate the deeper 
sources of insecurity and tension in the world today. The War on Terror is not a 
clash of religions, but rather a clash of two lines out of modernism, both 
legitimising themselves in terms of their own traditional claims on the Truth. 
There is nothing intrinsically bad about politicians and peoples drawing on 
writings about faith, existence and transcendence, however in the context of a 
refusal to interrogate the sources of violence in the world today it has to be done 
without the criminal hubris of political leaders such as George W. Bush, Tony 
Blair and John Howard. 
Endnotes 
1• The concept of 'post-sacred', like 'postmodern', carries the prefix 'post' in the sense of a 
formation that comes after and overlays prior formations without necessarily replacing 
them. The concepts tribalism, traditionalism, modernism and postmodernism (and 
variations such as late-modernism) are used as the most general terms of a matrix of 
overlaying ontological formations. 
2
· Incidently, Paul Keating was the one past Australian Prime Minister who refused to go to 
London to celebrate the anniversary of Federation. 
3
• Here sign is used in the Levi-Straussian sense of a lived sign rather than as reflexively 
understood symbol. A symbol in the present argument is more abstract in its reach than a 
sign. The nation is built on an increasingly self-conscious process of symbolic construction 
layered over a matrix of primordial signs. 
4
• That term 'crusades' was withdrawn from the lexicon of the US establishment after the 
obvious reference to an earlier 'clash of civilizations' in the Middle Ages, Christian and 
Islamic, was pointed out. 
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